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EFFECTS OF THE FACTORY RESET ON 
MOBILE DEVICES 
Riqui Schwamm and Neil C. Rowe 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School 
Computer Science Department 
Monterey, CA 93943 USA 
{rschwamm, ncrowe}@nps.edu 
ABSTRACT 
Mobile devices usually provide a “factory-reset” tool to erase user-specific data from the main 
secondary storage. 9 Apple iPhones, 10 Android devices, and 2 BlackBerry devices were tested 
in the first systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of factory resets. Tests used the Cellebrite 
UME-36 Pro with the UFED Physical Analyzer, the Bulk Extractor open-source tool, and our 
own programs for extracting metadata, classifying file paths, and comparing them between 
images. Two phones were subjected to more detailed analysis. Results showed that many kinds 
of data were removed by the resets, but much user-specific configuration data was left. Android 
devices did poorly at removing user documents and media, and occasional surprising user data 
was left on all devices including photo images, audio, documents, phone numbers, email 
addresses, geolocation data, configuration data, and keys. A conclusion is that reset devices can 
still provide some useful information to a forensic investigation. 
Keywords: mobile device, forensics, factory reset, file types, Cellebrite, privacy 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
An increasing amount of criminal activity uses 
mobile devices (McMillan, Glisson, and 
Bromby, 2013). Devices do provide ways to 
erase user information from secondary storage 
and criminals will likely use them. However, 
these methods are not entirely effective and 
information of forensic value can be left after 
these attempts to erase it. In addition, with 
frequent device upgrades by manufacturers, 
discarded older devices are common. This 
paper attempts to determine how much and 
what kind of residual user data are left after a 
“factory reset” or “wipe” intended to remove 
user data. This analysis will aid forensic 
examiners that encounter reset drives. 
Recently a number of researchers have 
developed methodologies for forensic 
investigation of mobile devices (Marturana, et 
al., 2011; Omeleze and Venter, 2013; Owen, 
Thomas, and McPhee, 2010). Systematic 
analysis of mobile devices differs somewhat 
from that of desktop and laptop computers 
because of the difficulty of accessing the main 
secondary storage, which is usually a flash 
storage soldered to the device board. Cutting 
out and removing the storage (Alghafli, Jones, 
and Martin, 2012) usually destroys the device 
functionality. Hence most mobile forensic 
tools attempt to access the storage through 
the operating system. Several issues particular 
to mobile devices arise such as finding where 
data are stored and dealing with data 
aggregation. For instance, on most 
smartphones the call records are stored in a 
single file. In addition, the operating system 
may not permit access to all files. 
The term “factory reset” is used by 
manufacturers to mean restoring an electronic 
device to the state when it left the factory, 
deleting all user data and third-party 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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applications in the process (Rouse, 2013). It 
should be done when discarding a device or 
transferring it to a new owner. The concept is 
clear when referring to music players and 
other simple devices, but its meaning is less 
clear for complex mobile devices where some 
user data may be necessary to configure it 
adequately, and some user data are stored 
within operating-system files. 
No systematic testing appears to have 
been done of the factory reset on mobile 
devices, although technology websites report 
gripes (The Guardian, 2013). For example, 
(Smith, 2012) tested secondhand phones 
purchased through Craigslist where a factory 
rest had been performed on the devices.  Data 
that they found included court records, social 
security numbers, resumes, college 
applications, child support documents, 
employee records, bank statements, credit-
card statements, tax returns, email, contact 
lists, and photos. One investigation (Cardwell, 
2013) studied the effects of a factory reset on 
network data left on an Android phone.  Data 
was transferred between Android phones and 
multiple network access points (cellular, 
wireless, and Bluetooth). Residual data in 
secondary storage on test phones after the 
reset included “userdata” partitions containing 
Service Set Identifiers, wireless-router 
Subscriber Identity Modules, DHCP ACKs 
from wireless routers, and base-station 
metadata that included the Mobile Network 
Code, Mobile Country Code, Local Area Code 
and Cell Identification, wireless router Media 
Access control addresses, and Bluetooth 
addresses of devices paired with the phone. 
These reports suggests that useful 
forensics on reset devices is indeed possible. 
They also raise worrisome questions about the 
privacy of information stored on mobile 
devices. Privacy of personal information is 
currently subject of much attention (Payton 
and Claypoole, 2014). If private data are left 
on devices after users have reset them, users 
may be able to sue manufacturers, and this 
needs to be factored into business decisions 
(Kauffman, Lee, and Sougstad, 2009). Matters 
are even worse if the data left on devices are 
unpredictable as it appears to be from the 
anecdotal reports. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL 
SETUP 
Tools from Cellebrite 
(www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensics) were 
used to extract data from the main storage of 
test devices. The Cellebrite UME-36 Pro 
Universal Memory Exchanger 1.2.2.3 
hardware accessed the devices, and the 
Cellebrite UFED Physical Analyzer 3.7.2.0 
software analyzed the images. Other products 
claiming similar functionality include the 
Forensic Toolkit (www.accessdata.com), 
Oxygen Forensic Suite (www.oxygen-
forensic.com), EnCase Neutrino 
(www.guideancesoftware.com), Recuva 
(www.piriform.com), and ViaExtract 
(viaforensics.com). The Oxygen Forensic suite 
was tested on some of our phones and it 
appeared to work well. ViaExtract showed 
compatibility issues with some Android 
phones (the Samsung Galaxy SIII and the 
Motorola Atrix 4G). Recuva is primarily for 
hard drive recovery; it could extract small 
data sets but did not provide useful analysis.  
A full ufd-format dump of the file system 
on each device was made by the Cellebrite 
Physical Analyzer. A program was written to 
calculate DFXML metadata 
(www.nsrl.nist.gov/DFXML /fileobject.xsd) 
on the dumps, including calculation of hash 
values on files. Another program discussed in 
section 4.2 was written to compare the pre-
reset and post-reset DFXML metadata. A 
taxonomy from (Rowe, 2013) was used to 
classify files by extension and directory.  The 
Bulk Extractor tool from digitalcorpora.org 
(Garfinkel, 2013) was used to extract strings. 
We did not exclude operating-system files 
from analysis because our previous work 
(Rowe, 2013) found some user data in them.  
Except for two unresponsive phones and 
also in section 3.4, resets were performed 
through software using each device’s setup 
menu under “Privacy” or “Backup & Reset”. 
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The reset takes a few minutes after which the 
device restarts. 
2.1 Other Storage for Devices 
This work focused on the main nonvolatile 
storage.  A separate removable memory card 
on some phones (“SIM” or “subscriber identity 
module”) contains the user’s identity, account 
information, and keys, and is necessary to 
make phone calls. It may also contain text 
messages and contacts depending on the 
phone. SIM cards were not available for most 
of our phones. SIM cards are unaffected by a 
factory reset and contain information of 
definite forensic interest, so they should be 
analyzed if available. 
Besides SIM cards, many devices have 
additional removable storage in the form of 
SD or MMC cards that is not subject to the 
factory reset. No such cards were available for 
the devices tested in section 4, but 76 cards 
comprising 54,279 files were acquired from 
smartphone images from an international 
corpus. Classifying its files by extension using 
our taxonomy, 31.7% were camera pictures, 
15.0% were audio, 11.8% were video, 5.6% 
were documents, and 5.6% had no extension. 
Hence these cards had rich materials for 
forensic investigation compared with 4.3% 
camera images, 4.8% audio, and 0.1% video 
on the mobile-device main-storage corpus to 
be described. That suggests that the cards 
should be checked first when available in a 
forensic investigation. 
3. EXPERIMENTS WITH 
TWO PHONES 
To get a more detailed view of what a reset 
accomplishes, experiments were done with an 
Apple iPhone 4S phone (p18 in Table 3) and 
an Android Samsung Galaxy SIII phone (p9), 
after making copies of the original pre-reset 
and post-reset images to use later. These 
experiments placed specific files on the phones 
that we thought should be deleted by a reset. 
3.1 Experimental Protocol 
The phones were “factory-reset”; a protocol 
was followed to put applications and data 
onto the phones; images were taken of the 
phone with the Cellebrite Physical Analyzer; 
the phones were reset again; and images were 
taken again.  The furnished data included 
distinctive keywords to make it easier to 
recognize forensically. The phones were not 
connected to a cellular account, so messaging 
services could not be tested. The protocol 
was: 
1. Reset the device. 
2. Visit four specified websites: nps.edu, 
fark.com, yahoo.com, and npr.org. 
3. Take six pictures with the built-in 
camera and rename three distinctively. 
4. Click on eight specified links to Web 
pages and documents (4 html, 1 docx, 
1 pdf, 1 pptx, and 1 wav file). 
5. Download to the root directory of the 
phone a specified text document and 
zip file. 
6. For the Android: (a) download and 
install the Facebook app, login, and 
browse specified pages; (b) download 
and install the Google Drive app, 
login/sync, and open three specified 
files; (c) download and install the 
DropBox (www.dropbox.com) app, 
login/sync, and open three specified 
files; (d) download and install the 
YouTube app, login, and watch three 
specified videos; (e) download and 
install the Audible app, login, and 
download three specified excerpts; (f) 
download and install the Kindle app, 
login, and open three specified PDF 
files; and (g) download and install the 
“Reddit Is Fun” app, and visit three 
specified postings. 
For the iPhone: (a) view three 
YouTube videos with the installed 
software;  
(b) create three specified note entries 
with the installed software; and (c) 
create three specified reminders with 
the installed software.  (The iPhone 
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does not allow download of arbitrary 
software and files.) 
3.2 Analysis of the Android Test Phone 
On the Android, 5,141 files were recovered 
pre-reset and 3,578 post-reset, of which 3,292 
matched exactly in both path and contents. 
After deleting partial matches or analogous 
files (defined as being on filename and hash, 
hash only, path only, or path ignoring digits), 
there were 968 pre-reset and 65 post-reset files 
that did not match in both path and contents 
between pre-reset and post-reset images. We 
conclude that 968 files were deleted and 65 
were added by the reset.  278 of the post-reset 
files had zero size of which 227 also had zero 
size before the reset.  The number of 
executable “.apk” files went from 396 to 277, 
“.dex” files from 140 to 121, and “.so” files 
from 302 to 254, so executables were not 
filtered much by the reset. The “copies and 
backup” category went from 512 to 33 files, 
but otherwise the Android reset did not seem 
to target any particular extensions or 
directories. 
The reset of the Android was not effective 
at deleting emplaced files as it did not delete 
any images taken with the camera, nor the 
created txt, doc, pdf, and ppt files, nor some 
cache and deleted copies of these files and 
their image components. (The other Androids 
similarly did not delete these files, so the 
operating-system version did not affect this.) 
The reset did delete most third-party 
applications, but it had trouble with the 
Kindle and DropBox applications and left 
documents of the previous owner of the 
phone. Using BulkExtractor, 116 links to 
three visited Web sites were found pre-reset in 
various files, but all were deleted post-reset.  
The reset left intact many operating-
system files; 1,971 files with modification 
times older than one week before the reset 
were present before the reset and exactly the 
same number after. Our previous research 
showed that user data may be contained in 
operating-system files of settings and logs. 
Table 1 lists some example files remaining 
after the reset that could be interesting for 
forensic purposes. None of the Android phones 
still had a SD card and directories used to 
store SD-card data were not specifically 
searched. However, data was found under 
‘USERDATA/Root/media/0’, which should 
have been erased during a reset. Again, there 
is a variety of indirect information about 
usage in addition to the direct information of 
the undeleted user files. 
 
Table 1 Some Forensically Interesting Files on the Test Android after Reset 
File Description 
CACHE/Root/recovery/last_log Ascii recovery log 
SYSTEM/Root/addon.d \/blacklist Four hexadecimal MD5 hash values 
SYSTEM/Root/etc/apns-conf.xml Ascii phone carrier IP address 
SYSTEM/Root/etc/audio_policy.conf Ascii audio devices listing 
SYSTEM/Root/etc/gps.xml Ascii GPS settings 
USERDATA/Root/backup/pending/journal2114683955.tmp Data backup 
USERDATA/Root/data/com.android.providers.calendar  
/databases/calendar.db 
Ascii calendar data 
USERDATA/Root/data/com.android.deskclock/databases 
/alarms.db 
Ascii alarm data 
USERDATA/Root/media/0/amazonmp3/temp/log.txt Ascii log file of Amazon Cloud 
Player 
USERDATA/Root/media/0/Android/data/com.andrew.apollo 
/cache/ImageCache/3910b1e0ccab19bc46fd9db27cca49c9.0 
Binary image cache data 
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3.3 Analysis of the iPhone Test Phone 
On the iPhone, 61,276 files were recovered 
pre-reset and 43,165 post-reset, of which 
42,728 matched exactly in both path and 
contents; iPhones had more files than 
Androids. After deleting partial matches 
(defined as in section 3.2), there were 17,914 
pre-reset files and 115 post-reset that did not 
match, so we conclude 17,914 files were 
deleted and 115 added by the reset.  36,319 of 
the post-reset files had zero size of which 
36,292 were also had zero size before reset; 
that indicates that zero-size files after the 
reset convey some forensic information since 
they are almost certainly present before the 
reset. The number of executable “.app” files 
went from 24,862 pre-reset to 8,062 post-reset, 
but the number of files of all kinds in 
recognizable operating-system directories went 
from 29,812 to 27,621, so the operating-system 
files were generally preserved. 
The reset on the iPhone did well in 
deleting most files put on it by user activity, 
due to Apple’s tighter control on what can be 
put on the phone.  All the images and 
documents were deleted by the reset except 
for some cache and settings information from 
YouTube, and all third-party software except 
for Facebook. Table 2, however, lists example 
files remaining after 
 
Table 2 Some Forensically Interesting Files on the Test iPhone after Reset 
File Description 
System/InnsbruckTaos11B554a.N90OS/System/Library/
PrivateFrameworks/Preferences.framework/ 
SupplementalLocaleData.plist 
Binary location and language settings 
System/InnsbruckTaos11B554a.N90OS/usr/share/ 
mecabra/ja /rerank.dat 
Binary resource rankings 
Data/Data/Keychains/keychain-2.db Ascii keys 
Data/Data/logs/lockdownd.log Ascii security event log 
Data/Data/mobile/Applications/B8AD4B05-2518-4570-
8447-7BE2BFDA8F9F/Library/Preferences/ 
com.apple.mobilesafari.plist 
Ascii browser preferences 
Data/Data/mobile/Library 
/BulletinBoard/SectionInfo.plist 
Ascii bulletin board index 
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Caches 
/com.apple.springboard /Cache.db-wal 
Ascii screen cache for user "wal" 
Data/Data/mobile/Library 
/Cookies/com.apple.itunesstored.2.sqlitedb 
Ascii cookies for iTunes 
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Mail/Content Index Nonrandom encoded mail keywords 
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Maps/Bookmarks.plist Ascii map bookmarks 
Data/Data/mobile/Library 
/Preferences/com.apple.identityservicesd.plist 
Ascii account information 
Data/Data/mobile/Media/PhotoData/changes-shm Incremental photo data 
USERDATA/Root/media/0/iPhone3G.2013-11-07.16-39-30 
/Email/108/478/1256.sql 
Text database script of ours, 
unclear how it got here 
USERDATA/Root/misc/wifi/softap.conf Ascii access-point data 
USERDATA/Root/system/users/userlist.xml Ascii User ID information 
USERDATA/Root/drm/fwdlock/kek.dat Lock data 
USERDATA/Root/media/0/Android/data/com.dropbox.androi
d /files/scratch/09thesis_regan.pdf 
PDF document of previous phone 
user 
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File Description 
Data/Data/root/Library/Caches/locationd 
/consolidated.db 
Ascii location data 
Data/Data/tmp/MediaCache /diskcacherepository.plist Ascii disk cache information 
  
the reset that could be interesting for forensic 
purposes by providing indirect information 
about what the user was doing.  Despite 
Apple’s claims (Apple, 2014) of using AES-
256 hardware encryption to protect user data 
and deleting the key during a factory reset, 
we did find unencrypted data in the form of 
Ascii files in cache, log, and preference files 
though its precise purpose was unclear. 115 
new post-reset files did include files of forensic 
value in directories UserSettings, 
EffectiveUserSettings, 
com.apple.mobilemail/Cache, fsCachedData, 
photostream, and bulletinboard, apparently 
from the reset and subsequent rebooting, and 
Table 2 includes some examples.  
“Preferences” can include private user 
information (Zhu et al., 2014) though we saw 
none here.  However just using the data we 
found using BulkExtractor, an investigator 
could determine where the user was, when 
and how they used the device, their deleted 
applications, network configuration, cache 
data, keywords, and even some plaintext keys.  
Timeline analysis showed the reset 
reduced the number of files with modification 
times within the last month from 18,000 
before the reset to 500 after the reset.  On the 
other hand, of the files with modification 
times earlier than one week before the reset, 
there were 43,984 before the reset and 42,468 
after. It appears that older files are rarely 
deleted in a reset, but it is unclear whether 
this is due to their timestamps, location, or 
contents. 
3.4 Effects of Alternative Resets 
Most devices provide an alternative “hardware 
reset” using the hardware keys (with many 
different device-specific procedures described 
on factory-reset.com), and this is usually 
coupled to rebooting. On the test Android, 
the hardware reset gave a new menu which 
enforced a “cache reset” as well (an option for 
the software reset).  An image after this kind 
of reset was taken on our test Android after 
the regular reset, and 3391 files out of 3578 
remained identical. It did not delete any of 
the files and media put on the device, and 
deleted only the sixth interesting file in Table 
1. Only four files all with extension “db” were 
deleted, two for Bluetooth and two for 
“optables”. Six new files were added, two 
Bluetooth cache files and four “telephony” 
files.  Thus it appears that the cache reset 
does not do much beyond the regular reset, 
though it apparently does not execute 
identical code.  
The iPhone hardware reset just sends the 
user to the regular reset “Erase All Content 
and Settings” used in section 3.2. But newer 
iPhones provide six additional software reset 
options that can confuse users: “Reset All 
Settings”, “Reset Network Settings”, “Reset 
Keyboard and Dictionary”, “Reset Home 
Screen Layout”, and “Reset Location and 
Memory”. In our experiments, all of these 
were selected, an image taken, and the results 
were compared to that of just doing the first 
option. 222 additional files were deleted and 
144 were added to the 43,165 files, so it did 
delete additional files, but nothing in Table 2. 
No obvious patterns were discerned in the 
deletions. Thus it appears that the additional 
reset options do not affect very much though 
they do not execute identical code as the 
regular reset. 
We also employed a “firmware reset” to 
restore the test Android back to the standard 
Android operating system after a regular 
reset. We then took an image, did a regular 
software reset, took an image, did another 
software reset, and took a final image. The 
second regular reset deleted 161 files and 
added 259, and the third regular reset deleted 
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98 and added 88. This shows that effects of 
the firmware reset were inconsistent even on a 
previously reset device, which suggests 
opportunities for investigators. 
4.  EXPERIMENTS WITH 
A SET OF DEVICES 
4.1 The Mobile Corpus Used 
To see how general this analysis was, pre-reset 
and post-reset images of 21 previously owned 
devices were analyzed (Table 3). Some were 
from the Real Data Corpus (Garfinkel et al, 
2009) of drives purchased as used equipment 
and were unmodifiable.  Others were 
smartphones that have been used for other 
research projects at our school and were 
modifiable. Additional files were created and 
downloaded for the modifiable devices 
similarly to the experiments in section 3. 
None of the phones were password-protected 
and no data were explicitly encoded or 
encrypted. Unlike in section 3, the devices 
were not reset before taking pre-reset images 
(and the two phones of section 3 were imaged 
before the tests reported there) to test 
persistence of a wider range of files. 
 
Table 3 Devices Tested in Our Mobile Corpus 
# Device OS Version Status 
p1 Apple iPhone 4 5.1.1 OK 
p2 Apple iPhone 4 5.1.1 OK 
p3 Apple iPhone 2 3.1.3 OK 
p4 Apple iPhone 2 3.1.3 OK 
p5 Apple iPhone 2 3.1.3 OK 
p6 Apple iPhone 2 3.1.3 OK 
p7 Apple iPhone 2 3.1.3 OK 
p8 Apple iPhone 2 3.0 OK 
p9 Samsung Galaxy SIII CM 10.1 Hard reset only 
p10 Samsung Nexus CM 10.1 OK 
p11 Samsung Galaxy Anycall 1.5 OK 
p12 Motorola Atrix 4G 2.2 OK 
p13 HTC Droid Eris 2.1 OK 
p14 HTC Magic 1.6 Hard reset only 
p15 HTC Flyer (tablet) 3.2 OK 
p16 HTC One 4.1.2 OK 
p17 BlackBerry 8900 Curve 4 Unusable after reset 
p18 Apple iPhone 4S 5.1.1 OK 
p19 Apple iPhone 2G 3.13 Unusable without SIM card 
p20 BlackBerry 8100 Pearl  4.5.0.174 OK 
p21 BlackBerry 8300 Curve 4.5.0.162 OK 
p22 Motorola FIRE 2.3.4 Unrecognized by Cellebrite 
p23 Huawei U8500 2.1 OK 
p24 Huawei  U8150 IDEOS Comet 2.2 Unusable after reset 
p25  Dell XCD35 2.2 OK 
p26 Apple iPhone 2 3.1.3 Unusable after reset 
p27 Motorola Charm 2.1 Totally dead 
p28 LG-500GHL Unknown Unrecognized by Cellebrite 
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The table lists the devices tested, with a 
variety of manufacturers and operating-
system versions to provide breadth to 
experiments. Very few files were found on the 
BlackBerry images and no software, so 
Cellebrite appears to have had trouble 
imaging them. Those not identified as Apple 
or BlackBerry were Google Android devices, 
and two had a custom operating system 
CyanogenMod 10.1. The table indicates 
several problems in using the devices, 
resetting them, and analyzing them.  Some 
devices (p22 and p28) could not be handled at 
all by Cellebrite. Some devices (p27) were 
apparently faulty. Some (p19) had special 
requirements that could not be accomplished.  
Some (p9 and p14) had special requirements 
for reset. Some (p17, p24, and p26) had a too-
efficient reset that made the devices 
subsequently unable to restart. Also, four 
phones needed to be processed more than once 
due to Cellebrite crashes. It appears that 
forensic investigators will need to accept a 
significant failure rate in attempts to analyze 
devices they acquire.   
4.2 Effects of Resets on File Counts 
Many files were unchanged by the reset. 
Table 4 gives a summary of pre-reset and 
post-reset file counts. As before, there were 
four types of partial matches between pre-
reset and post-reset:  filename and hash 
(typically, when a file is moved), hash only 
(when a file is copied), path only (when a file 
is modified), and path ignoring digits (for 
temporary files). The “unmatched” files post-
reset are interesting as they represent new 
records created by the reset itself and routine 
operating-systems activity. As we saw in 
section 3, resets do not simply erase devices; 
they delete many files, but rename others and 
add some new ones.
Table 4 Summary Data on the 21 Usable Devices 
File count type Pre-reset Post-reset 
Total files 349,915 200,987 
iPhone files 299,058 176,907 
Android files 50,846 24,058 
Exact matches pre-reset and post-reset 140,320 140,320 
Subsequent matches on filename and hash value but not all 
directories 
34,228 36,540 
Subsequent matches on hash value alone 9,269 12,911 
Subsequent matches on full path alone 2,849 2,836 
Subsequent matches on full path ignoring digits alone 6,448 256 
Remaining unmatched 156,801 8,124 
 
To get a better understanding of what 
kinds of files are being removed, files were 
classified by type of file extension (E) and 
type of the immediate directory (D) (Table 
5). Our current taxonomy classifies 8,346 
extensions and 6,445 directory names, labeling 
the rest as “miscellaneous”. Proposed 
extensions longer than 10 characters were 
ignored, and the file path above the bottom-
level directory was searched until a directory 
was found which could be classified. 
Overall, it appears that resets 
preponderantly target files with extensions of 
pictures, video, documents, copies and 
temporaries, disk images, logs, XML and 
games. They had little effect on extensions of 
operating-system files, configuration files, and 
executable files. Results were similar with 
classifying files by immediate directories. The 
resets primarily targeted files in directories 
mentioning pictures, video, documents, 
temporaries, Web pages, applications, and 
games. They had little effect on directories of 
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the operating system, security, and the root. 
Thus resets appear to predominantly target 
third-party software and some (but not all) 
categories of likely user files, but ignore user 
data in the operating system and other 
configuration data. We observed that the 
number and types of files deleted did not 
differ significantly on the more-recent 
operating systems (p10, p15, p16, and p18).
Table 5 File Type Counts Before and After Reset 
Type of file Count before reset Count after reset 
E: No extension 36561 21078 
E: Operating system 106168 104406 
E: Graphics 98618 27522 
E: Camera pictures 15443 3967 
E: Temporaries 733 159 
E: Web pages 1418 680 
E: Documents 3089 1233 
E: Spreadsheets 425 356 
E: Compressed 601 278 
E: Audio 16427 8313 
E: Video 303 90 
E: Source code 1791 736 
E: Executables 3432 2856 
E: Disk image 13828 1932 
E: Log 599 73 
E: Copies and backup 7347 905 
E: XML 5193 1045 
E: Configuration 20788 18379 
E: Games 3741 1048 
D: Root 1012 966 
D: Operating system 122625 117701 
D: Hardware 1128 319 
D: Temporaries 12141 2928 
D: Pictures 17950 4328 
D: Audio 10812 7814 
D: Video 2570 0 
D: Web 2714 277 
D: Data 18300 9771 
D: Programs 3616 2876 
D: Documents 6211 1036 
D: Sharing 7500 2368 
D: Security 2953 2749 
D: Games 53722 0 
D: Applications 84593 46696 
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Zero-size files increased (120,112 before 
and 128,026 after) but files whose path 
contained the word “DELETED” decreased 
(20,087 before and 4,181 after).  Files are 
designated for deletion for a good reason 
and it would seem reasonable to delete them 
in a reset. Zero-size files are useless to 
software, but may provide information 
about the user just in their zero size, as for 
instance empty log files that say the user 
has not done anything in the category of the 
log. Investigators should be aware that the 
Cellebrite software reported different fronts 
of the paths, and also different creation and 
access times, on the same image with 
different releases of their software. 
4.3 Cellebrite Analysis of Files 
The devices were previously used for a 
variety of purposes. Specific kinds of 
information within files were searched for 
using the Cellebrite Physical Analyzer 
(Tables 6, 7, and 8). The rows correspond to 
Cellebrite categories and the type codes are 
I=iPhone, A=Android, and B=BlackBerry.  
Cellebrite describes its categories as: 
• Application usage: application name, 
number of launches, activations, 
active time, and date 
• Call log: caller phone number, time 
stamp, duration, and type (incoming, 
outgoing, or missed) 
• Contacts: contacts name, 
organizations, phone number, emails, 
other entries, notes, and addresses 
• Cookies 
• Installed applications: application 
name, version, identifier, application 
ID, purchase date, and delete date 
• IP connections: timestamp, domain, 
router address MAC address, 
Cellular WAN, Device IP, DNS 
address, and service name 
• Locations: timestamp, position, and 
name 
• Maps: source, zoom level, and tiles 
• Passwords 
• SMS messages: timestamp, type of 
folder, phone number, text string, 
and sending status 
• User accounts: name, user name, 
password, and service type 
• User dictionary: word, locale, and 
bookmark note 
• Wireless networks: last connected, 
BSSId, SSId, and security mode 
• Content file types: picture images, 
audio, text, databases, configuration, 
application 
• Directory information: name, path, 
size, metadata, created, modified, 
accessed, bookmark note 
One lesson of these tables is that effects 
of resets differ between devices. To confirm 
the results, the extracted data were viewed 
in the Physical Analyzer. Nearly all the 
connection data in both sets was removed 
after a reset, including call logs, contacts, 
cookies, IP connection data, SMS data, 
maps, passwords, and user directories. But 
location data were left on p6 (an IPhone) of 
latitude and longitude for a cell tower and a 
corresponding time stamp. This is sensitive 
user information since it reveals the when 
and where a user has been. Null account 
data were found on several devices 
indicating that a user account had existed at 
some point. Null wireless network data also 
occurred indicating a previous wireless 
connection. 
Applications data generally only 
contained information from first-party 
software installed on the phone, indicated 
by the identifier com.appl for iPhones and 
com.google for Android phones.  The data 
was contained various framework, library, 
and plug-in information for system software 
including maps, video, mobile mail, 
calculators, weather, preferences, and mobile 
notes which could be considered user data. 
The application data on p16 contained user-
account information before the reset, but 
the Physical Analyzer mislabeled it as 
installed applications.  It also could not 
identify any installed applications on the p7 
and p8 iPhones after the factory reset but 
there must have been some or the phone 
would not have functioned. 
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Table 6 Data Counts (Post-Reset/Pre-Reset) on Test Devices, Part 1 
Phone p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 
Type I I I I I I I I 
App. Usage 0/0 0/0 1/199 0/0 1/125 1/56 9/23 0/23 
Call Log 0/0 0/2 0/103 0/0 0/107 0/104 0/13 0/105 
Contacts 0/0 0/0 0/209 0/0 0/1461 0/2366 0/0 0/284 
Cookies 0/0 0/0 0/5 0/0 0/0 0/43 0/0 0/6 
Installed Apps. 34/34 34/34 23/127 28/34 23/142 23/56 0/24 0/79 
IP Connections 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/7 
Locations 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 5/10 0/0 0/72 
Maps 0/0 0/0 0/12 0/0 0/0 0/2 0/0 0/19 
Passwords 0/6 0/5 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
SMS Messages 0/0 0/2 0/30 0/0 0/1152 0/50 0/0 0/672 
User Accounts 0/0 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/6 1/1 1/3 
User Dictionary 0/0 0/1 0/161 0/0 0/30 0/312 0/0 0/819 
Wireless Networks 0/0 1/1 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Images 3714/ 
3716 
3715/ 
3716 
2488/ 
16541 
2631/ 
2716 
2488/ 
25106 
5888/ 
14477 
2491/ 
2611 
2488/ 
13705 
Audio 1/1 1/1 2/2512 1/1 2/1202 2/1125 2/2 2/1120
Text 159/161 159/164 11/392 20/34 11/1689 12/67 12/21 12/135
Databases 31/38 32/43 13/60 21/50 23/54 12/63 13/24 23/55 
Configuration 2797/ 
2969 
2831/ 
2959 
1349/ 
4798 
1976/ 
2969 
1352/ 
6978 
1345/ 
2237 
1348/ 
1382 
1349/ 
10930 
Applications 6/ 
6 
6/ 
10 
164/ 
489 
227/ 
304 
164/ 
458 
164/ 
200 
164/ 
310 
164/ 
670 
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Table 7 Data Counts (Post-Reset/Pre-Reset) on Test Devices, Part 2 
Phone p9 p10 p11 p12 p13 p14 p15 p16 
Type A A A A A A A A 
App. Usage 0/0 1/139 0/0 0/102 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Call Log 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/52 0/5 0/6 0/0 7/192 
Contacts 0/0 0/5 0/0 0/48 0/0 0/2 0/0 0/65 
Cookies 0/0 0/3 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/5 0/0 0/0 
Installed Apps. 30/30 48/102 25/43 23/32 26/70 20/24 12/44 0/0 
IP Connections 0/0 0/2 0/0 0/3 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 
Locations 0/0 0/0 0/5 0/0 0/10 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Maps 0/15 0/5 0/8 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Passwords 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/1 0/0 
SMS Messages 0/80 0/5 0/0 0/121 0/0 0/2 0/0 0/66 
User Accounts 1/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/1 0/0 0/1 
User Dictionary 0/132 0/50 0/0 0/84 0/40 0/1 0/0 0/0 
Wireless Networks 0/1 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 
Images 150/ 
150 
764/ 
764 
11 
/11 
1815/ 
1815 
42/ 
42 
15/ 
15 
9/ 
9 
616/ 
616 
Audio 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/0 4/4 1/1 243/26
3 
Text 130/13
0 
48/48 0/0 132/13
2 
1/1 0/0 4/4 1/1 
Databases 5/65 12/45 0/0 25/41 0/0 10/24 0/0 16/36 
Configuration 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Applications 0/0 313/31
3 
0/0 7/7 3/3 1/1 24/24 0/3 
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Table 8 Data Counts (Pre-Reset/Post-Reset) on Test Devices, Part 3 
Phone p18 p20 p21 p25 
Type A I B B 
App. Usage 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Call Log 0/1 0/100 0/11 0/61 
Contacts 0/0 0/477 0/0 5/252 
Cookies 0/17 0/0 0/0 0/16 
Installed Apps. 34/34 0/0 0/0 0/1 
IP Connections 1/6 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Locations 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/9 
Maps 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Passwords 5/9 0/0 0/0 • 0/1 
SMS Messages 0/0 0/4 0/0 0/76 
User Accounts 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/2 
User Dictionary 0/6 0/0 0/0 0/2 
Wireless Networks 3/7 0/0 0/0 0/1 
Images 3716/3743 0/ 7 0/3 71/159 
Audio 1/1 0/1 0/0 1/1 
Text 243/263 0/0 0/0 440/3031 
Databases 37/58 0/0 0/0 24/55 
Configuration 2850/2953 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Applications 6/6 0/0 0/0 388/390 
     
The Androids did not delete any user 
pictures.  The iPhones did a better job and 
no pictures including thumbnails were 
viewable after the factory reset. However, 
metadata (name, file path, size, created, 
modified, accessed) for the images was still 
viewable in the Physical Analyzer and this 
could violate privacy. Audio data were not 
removed from any of the Android set, 
including wav audio files from applications 
and user-downloaded mp3 files.  The iPhone 
set deleted most of the audio files, but some 
WAV files were still recoverable from the 
operating system and third-party software, 
and could be played on a media player.  
Database data (db, sqlite, and sql) were 
recovered from both sets but did not include 
any user data. What Cellebrite called 
configuration data was recovered from the 
iPhones but only contained system-file 
access data. 
4.4 String Searches in Post-Reset Files 
String searching was also done with Bulk 
Extractor for specialized kinds of strings, 
including those within encoded files such as 
compressed files, and with the Unix “grep” 
for Ascii strings in text files.  We chose a 
sample of keywords indicating possible user-
related security information including 
“password”, “root certificate”, “hash”, “cert”, 
“SHA1”, “MD4”, and “SSL”. The p10 
Android phone with Cyanogen was the only 
one that returned a value with the 
“password” keyword after reset, in an XML 
file under the Cyanogen system directory 
that contained website URLs and user 
names with passwords stored in clear text.  
All phones returned at least one file that 
contained the “root certificate” phrase and 
had a length between 115 and 144.  Searches 
for the strings “hash”, “cert”, “SHA1”, “MD5”, 
and “SSL” matched some configuration files, 
but they did not appear to contain any user 
data.  “Hash” occurred in post-reset 
configuration files for iPhones on which we 
found the application “Rocky Racoon” (p3, 
p4, p5, p6, p7, and p8), an application on 
“jailbroken” iPhones that try to circumvent 
the operating system. Such unauthorized 
software can damage a phone and may have 
affected the data. 
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Bulk Extractor also found email 
addresses, fax numbers, and phone numbers 
within files.  However, most findings were in 
manuals, acknowledgements, service 
agreements, and support information for 
system software, recognizable by such 
strings as “@tech” and “@helpdesk” and 1-
800 information phone numbers. The reset 
did appear to remove user-account and Wi-
Fi information. However, Bulk Extractor 
found several text files with IP addresses 
and domain names.  Geolocation data were 
found along with timestamps on p18, 
enabling a view of the locations at which the 
phone had been used. 
Bulk Extractor claimed to uncover text 
files that were not found by Cellebrite, for 
an additional 157 user files on the Android 
phones. Some of these were left behind by 
third-party applications such as DropBox 
where the reset removed the software but 
not all the data.  These included Microsoft 
Office files (Word, Excel), Adobe PDFs, and 
MP4 video files. 
5.   CONCLUSION 
Files and data on 21 devices were analyzed 
before and after a “factory reset” and a 
variety of residual user information was 
found.  Android devices did not delete most 
emplaced user files in the reset, and both 
Android and iPhones did not delete a 
variety of indirect data from and about 
users.  On average 42% of the files on a 
device were deleted by the reset, with 
pictures, documents, copies, temporaries, 
logs, drive images, and games singled out for 
predominant removal, though some 
examples of each of these were spared. 
Modified files were also found after the 
reset, and even some new files, which 
reflected routine system operations. The 
year of the operating-system release did not 
affect results much.  7 of our original 28 
devices could not be imaged either post-reset 
or pre-reset, so there was a significant 
failure rate which will probably be similar 
for other investigations of mobile devices. 
These results show that much can be 
understood about resets without having to 
reverse-engineer operating-systems code. 
The results were dependent on Cellebrite 
software, and it appeared to miss 157 files 
on the Androids. However, it is the major 
vendor of mobile-device forensic software 
and has had years of successful use, so the 
data it provided is likely highly accurate. 
These results have implications both for 
forensic investigations and for user privacy.  
Users are confronted with confusing choices 
for resets on both the iPhone (six options) 
and the Android (three options), so they 
may not reset what they want, and this 
provides a forensic opportunity. Even with a 
proper reset, Androids do not delete much 
of forensic interest, and both Androids and 
iPhones left plenty of clues to the device 
usage in the remaining files, although it 
becomes harder to extract them once a 
device has been reset.  Software applications 
were major targets of the resets, but they 
are only occasionally interesting forensically. 
The number and kinds of files that were 
recoverable after the reset varied between 
devices and operating-system versions, 
consistent with the experiments of (Kubi, 
Saleem, and Popov, 2011) with extracting 
other kinds of data from mobile devices, so 
there are few guarantees about what gets 
deleted.  
As for implications for user privacy, 
further measures need to be taken by users. 
Users can encrypt their data, though it 
imposes an additional burden on them and 
it was not seen on our devices. For now, a 
user wishing to discard or give away the 
device, should (1) do a software or “factory” 
reset; (2) manually delete any remaining 
user files that have been moved to 
unconventional locations (like a compressed 
file in the root directory); (3) manually 
delete remaining user data from software 
directories; (4) delete remaining cache files, 
browser history files, cookies, and settings 
files; (5) delete zero-size files; (6) overwrite 
deleted data with zeros; (7) remove the SIM 
card and any other removable storage. 
Commercial software such as data erasing 
tools will be generally necessary for steps 2, 
3, and 6.  
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